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Drivers
• Information Technology - Adoption
– Safety & Quality
– Remote Access and Services
– High Speed Access
– Efficiency Gains
– Outsourcing Capabilities
– Preventative Health
– Satisfaction & Fulfillment 
Linked Data
• This all demands linking systems 
together (new and existing)
– linking data 
– linking technologies 
– linking enterprises
– linking people 
across Departmental, Organizational, 
State and International boundaries
This raises further questions
• What do you need to understand about securing linked 
systems?
• What new risks does integration and access to electronic 
data bring? 
• How can you do an effective risk analysis?
• Can we realistically look at an organisation’s service 
provision as a whole?
• Do privacy and security guidelines / legislation help or 
hinder?
• What role does Trust play?
• How relevant is the International scene?
The necessary trust can 
be fragile and easily 
broken through well 
publicized incidences!
Preventative Health Research Program
Colorectal Cancer Neurodegenerative
Diseases
Cardiovascular Disease Gut Health
Health Data and Information
 Protective food
 Diagnostics
 Policy guidelines
 Protective food
 Novel preventative 
approaches
 Policy guidelines
 Protective food
 Novel preventative 
approaches
 Policy guidelines
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Fellowship
• The Fellowship is investigating Risks to Health 
Data Integration with the emphasis on Security 
and Privacy
• In particular, establishing that the ‘systems’ in 
place are safe enough to prevent trust of the data 
providers and data custodians from being readily 
or unintentionally eradicated. 
• Such a systems-wide assessment includes - not 
only technical risks - administrative, legal and 
managerial risks. 
many stakeholders 
– many viewpoints
• Clinicians
• Managers
• Data Custodians
• Legal / Policy Officers
• IT technicians
• Clients (patients)
• Medical researcher 
Security Concerns
Websites exist (http://www.sans.org/top20/) that are 
dedicated to reporting on the most current:
‘Top 20 Internet Security Vulnerabilities’
• Currently the most venerable issue under cross-platform
services is ‘Backup Software’. 
• This is a valuable asset for any organization and typically 
runs across several servers, but the trend has been 
towards small number or a single large server to ease the 
administration overheads. 
• Unfortunately much of the commercial software has 
exploitable vulnerabilities allowing systems to be 
completely compromised. 
• That is, an attacker can leverage these flaws for an 
enterprise-wide compromise and obtain access to the 
sensitive backed-up data. 
Privacy Concerns
The Australian (IT Today) 
Tuesday March 21, 2006
Karen Dearne, Health correspondent
Consent Dispute in Health Project
“Mounting privacy and consent issues threaten to derail NSW Health’s long 
awaited electronic health records pilot, due to start in the Hunter Region”
“NSW acting privacy commissioner John Dickie met NSW Health 
yesterday over concerns that some aspects of the trial may be in breach 
of the state’s health record and information privacy laws.”
A compromise was reached whereby the precedence was set to allow the 
system to be regarded as an ‘opt-out’ option. 
Katherine McGrath, NSW Health deputy director-general for health 
system performance, stated "We're not trying to do this under the 
covers; we know lots of people are anxious about the changes, but the 
opt-in model was found to be too technically difficult to do, for a whole 
range of reasons."
Privacy and Related 
Legislation in Australia
NEHTA states that privacy protection in Australia is a complex patchwork: 
“It is considered possible to navigate the existing privacy environment 
although this is not without some risk and may require future changes”. 
Bureaucratic Concerns
The inability to access medical data could put 
valuable medical research at risk!
"There is no question that research is now at risk. 
Researchers are finding it increasingly difficult to get 
past the regulatory interpretation to allow their 
research to take place"
said Robert Souhami, a cancer researcher at University College London.
"and this is a detriment to public health.“
A UK report published Jan 06 by the Academy of Medical 
Sciences said that large population-scale medical studies 
are in jeopardy because of an "undue emphasis on 
privacy" by regulators.
Safety Concerns
Thousands of children at risk after computer fault
Babies miss injections as privatised NHS monitoring system 
breaks down
Jo Revill, health editor
Sunday February 26, 2006
Observer
As many as 3,000 babies and toddlers may have gone without 
crucial vaccinations because a privatised NHS computer system 
has failed …. 
An Observer investigation has found that the child health 
information system…. has derailed the country's entire 
vaccination programme leaving health staff resorting to slips of 
paper …
Several women whose babies were stillborn have received 
letters asking them to take their babies for their first 
vaccinations. 
Offshoring Concerns
DAVID LAZARUS
A tough lesson on medical privacy 
Pakistani transcriber threatens UCSF over back pay
Wednesday, October 22, 2003
"Your patient records are out in the open... so you better track
that person and make him pay my dues." 
A woman in Pakistan doing cut-rate clerical work for UCSF 
Medical Center threatened to post patients' confidential files 
on the Internet …
The violation of medical privacy - apparently the first of its kind 
- highlights the danger of "offshoring" work that involves 
sensitive materials …
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The Cycle of Calculated Risks and 
Work Practice Change 
Risk = Probability of 
Occurrence X Consequence
My study has identified that the 
main risks as seen by the 
data custodians include:
• Contacting the wrong people, i.e. data records linking to the 
wrong people or the wrong reasons (Ex)
• Other data custodians not providing them data for linkage (H)
• The incorrect use of data or for the wrong project or 
purpose (including identifying clinicians’ performance) (M→H)
• Not having sufficient knowledge or control over their own data, 
i.e. in hands of IT services or third party (M→H)
• The accidental disclosure of individuals (M)
• Not following the privacy principles and their local policies, i.e. 
as determined by ethics committees (M)
Whereas, my study has identified 
that the main risks as perceived 
by the public include: 
• Abuse of genetic data 
(e.g. disclosure to insurance companies)
• Release of sensitive information
(e.g. sexual, mental health)
• Government control of personal data 
(including concern of national identity cards)
• Use of data without an individual giving explicit consent
(primarily for research purposes)
• Poor data integrity
(information inaccurately recorded or records mismatched)
• Inadequate safeguards 
(any access by unauthorised people)
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The Cycle of Perceived Risks and Critical Factors 
Conclusions
• highly application dependent and dynamic
• trust in e-Health fragile
• increase understanding of interdependencies
• experts’ prediction significantly deviates from 
perceived risks
• modify methods to accommodate perceived risks
• survey consumer attitudes 
• international perspective
• develop technology to support compliance with 
policy and security policy generation 
• Please feel free to contact me:
croll@qut.edu.au
How can we improve things? 
- Research Needs
• Prof Souhami said that public concerns on privacy had to be respected, 
and called for scientists to have: “excellent standards of data 
security, excellent standards of ethical review [and] good 
practice in terms of anonymisation and acquiring consent”
• Our research is focusing on the use of IT to ascertain: 
• the end users knowledge
• check their intended usage
• map against legislation and local policies
• check their ethics clearances 
• enforce deadlines, audits and reviews 
• - before permitting access to the data linkage tools.
• To reassure the public, media and management that: 
• the risks have been assessed
• the probability of an incident has been estimated 
• and adequate protection mechanisms are in place 
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Obvious Security Scams
User ikxhudimsy [ikxhudimsy@dsl85-102-62145.ttnet.net.tr]; 
on behalf of; Commonwealth Bank Customer Support
• “Attention! If you will not activate new 
security system within one week we will 
have to temporary lock your account until 
your personality will be identified.”*
*Received by email on Monday 15th May 2006
More Sophistication
In 2006
Imagine a country without:
• Vaccinations
• Water/sanitation
• Seat belts
• Fluoride
• Food safety/nutrition
• HIV awareness
• Crash helmets
• Diagnostics/early 
detection
• Skin protection
• Preventative therapies
• Breast cancer screens
• Vaccinations
• Water/sanitation
• Seat belts
• Fluoride
• Food safety/nutrition
• HIV awareness
• Crash helmets
• Diagnostics/early 
detection
• Skin protection
• Preventative therapies
• Breast cancer screens
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Minimising the Privacy & Security 
Risks of Linked Health Data
• What are the risks? 
• How can we reduce them? 
• What techniques protect 
data for:
• clinical care
• health administration
• and secondary usage in 
research studies? 
All the mathematics is 
pointless if the system is 
not well managed!
The necessary trust can 
be fragile and easily 
broken through well 
publicized incidences!
• Do managers understand 
the maths? 
• Should they have to? 
“Information Technology makes 
extensive use of complex mathematical 
techniques to protect data. This includes 
both encryption and statistical analysis 
(e.g. the probability of back tracking 
with de-identified data or the probability 
of adverse incidences occurring).”
Towards 2045
• Reduction in the impact of 
chronic disorders
• Use of assistive technologies 
to enhance the functional 
capacity of an ageing 
population
• Protective foods
• Novel biomarkers and diagnostics
• New preventive strategies 
including chemoprevention
• Enabling and assistive 
technologies
• Integrated health data
• Information for the setting of 
lifestyle guidelines
HOW
*
* Productivity Commission 2005, Economic Implications of an Ageing Australia, Melbourne, April
Confidence Fragile with 
Internet Banking
What have others found to be the 
main risks?
UK Council for Science and Technology – Personal 
Information Risks identified:
• loss of confidence and trust in privacy
• unauthorised use of personal data
• exploitation of individual citizens for 
commercial gain
• statistical discrimination (e.g. creating a sub-culture 
of non-participation by individuals)
• technical risks such as database failure or 
incapacitation (e.g. by spam or unmanageable volumes 
of data)
• poor data quality
• cyber-terrorism
Consequences (Impact)
• Data not supplied by patients/custodians
• Patients offended – take legal action
• Research projects rejected by ethics
• Screening & prevention programs halted
• Loss of reputation and/or income
• Medical knowledge not advanced
• Incorrect treatment
• Collapse of health care provision (particularly in 
disaster response situations)
The QUiPS Risk Assessment Model
 
Attribute At Risk
Quality q.i. Not developing the right product 
(i.e. not meeting requirements) 
q.ii. Not developing a robust product  
(i.e. not well engineered)
Usability u.i. Degree of usage 
(i.e. full or partial use of functions)
u.ii. Acceptance by users  
(e.g. clinicians, patients, administrators)
Privacy p.i. System security 
(i.e. preventing unauthorised access)
p.ii. Patient confidentiality  
(e.g. not revealing personal health data)
Safety s.i. Harm to the system  
(e.g. availability, data corruption)
s.ii. Harm to people  
(e.g. medical errors, medical data integrity)
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How can we improve things? 
- Research Needs
• Prof Souhami said that public concerns on privacy had to be respected, 
and called for scientists to have: “excellent standards of data 
security, excellent standards of ethical review [and] good 
practice in terms of anonymisation and acquiring consent”
• Our research is focusing on the use of IT to ascertain: 
• the end users knowledge
• check their intended usage
• map against legislation and local policies
• check their ethics clearances 
• enforce deadlines, audits and reviews 
• - before permitting access to the data linkage tools.
• To reassure the public, media and management that: 
• the risks have been assessed
• the probability of an incident has been estimated 
• and adequate protection mechanisms are in place 
The Mathematics for Risk 
Assessment
Risk = Probability (of the Event) X Consequence

